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Abstract Group signatures are an important anonymity primitive al-
lowing users to sign messages while hiding in a crowd. At the same
time, signers remain accountable since an authority is capable of de-
anonymizing signatures via a process called opening. In many situations,
this authority is granted too much power as it can identify the author
of any signature. Sakai et al. proposed a flavor of the primitive, called
Group Signature with Message-Dependent Opening (GS-MDO), where
opening operations are only possible when a separate authority (called
“admitter”) has revealed a trapdoor for the corresponding message. So
far, all existing GS-MDO constructions rely on bilinear maps, partially
because the message-dependent opening functionality inherently implies
identity-based encryption. This paper proposes the first GS-MDO can-
didate based on lattice assumptions. Our construction combines the
group signature of Ling, Nguyen and Wang (PKC’15) with two layers
of identity-based encryption. These components are tied together using
suitable zero-knowledge argument systems.
Keywords: Group signatures, anonymity, lattice assumptions.
1 Introduction
Group signatures. Group signatures were introduced by Chaum and van
Heyst in 1991 [16] as a technique allowing users to sign messages while retaining
anonymity within a crowd of users they belong to. At the same, misbehaving group
members cannot remain unpunished as an authority, called opening authority,
is capable of tracing a signature to the user who generated it [5]. While such a
tracing mechanism is necessary to ensure user accountability, it arguably grants
excessive power to the opening authority which can retrieve the identity of any
well-behaved user from his signature. To address this issue, Sakai et al. [42]
suggested an extension, named group signature with message dependent opening
(GS-MDO), which provides a refined balance between accountability and privacy.
In GS-MDO systems, as formalized in [42], the identity of a signer can only be
determined from two pieces of information: the opening authority’s secret key
and a message-specific token delivered by a separate authority called the admitter.
Importantly, neither authority is able to trace any signature alone. Each opening
operation has to be approved by the admitter and, at the same time, the latter
cannot identify signers by itself as it is denied access to the opening authority’s
secret key.
A different way to avoid centralizing the opening capability would be to
split the opening authority’s private key into several shares scattered among
multiple servers using techniques from threshold cryptography [17]. This approach,
however, requires all shareholders to run a distributed decryption protocol (indeed,
any group signature implies a public-key encryption scheme [1]) at every single
opening operation, even for identical messages. The GS-MDO primitive comes
in handy when many signatures have to be opened on the same message. As a
motivating example, we can think of access control gates in public transportation.
In order to enter a metro station, the user can generate a signature (i.e., on a
message specifying the date and time or his ride) proving his possession of a
valid subscription without betraying his identity nor leaking any information on
his habits (e.g., the frequency of his rides). If an accident occurs or a crime is
committed, the police –which embodies the opening authority in this case – can
request the opening tokens for to the time period of the incident and determine
who was nearby at that time. In such a situation, the threshold opening approach
would incur a substantial overhead to open all the signatures generated by
commuters in a given time interval. In contrast, the GS-MDO primitive allows
de-anonymizing all signatures corresponding to a given message – no matter
how many users signed this message – without having the police interact any
further with the public transportation company once the latter has revealed a
message-specific token.
As another motivating application, we can think of anonymous comments
posted on a blog engine, where a moderator can use a token to open all signatures
related to forbidden messages. Yet another example consists of anonymous
auctions where bidders sign the amount of their bid: in case of equalities, a single
token allows identifying the multiple winners of the auction.
As such, message-dependent openings are relevant when the number of sig-
natures to be opened is potentially high. Moreover, it can be seen as providing
the dual functionality of traceable signatures [28]. As introduced by Kiayias,
Tsiounis and Yung [28], traceable signatures allow the group manager to release
a user-specific trapdoor using which all the signatures that user created can be
identified. This extended capability allows delegating the tracing operation to
parallel tracing agents who can detect all the transactions where a misbehaving
user is involved without affecting the anonymity of honest users. Group signatures
with message-dependent opening can be motivated in a similar way in that the
distributed tracing process can be made with respect to the message rather than
the users. If a signed message contains information about a specific suspicious
transaction, releasing a message-specific trapdoor makes it possible to trace all
parties involved in a given transaction determined by the signed message.
Lattice-based cryptography. Since the results of Regev [41] and Gentry-
Peikert-Vaikuntanathan [20], lattice-based cryptography has emerged (see [39] and
references therein) as a promising alternative to discrete-logarithm or factoring-
based technologies. This trend can be explained by the fact that lattices provide
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appealing advantages like simple arithmetic operations, their better asymptotic
efficiency or their potential as candidates for post-quantum cryptography: indeed,
quantum algorithms are not known to perform any better than classical ones
for well-studied problems like Learning With Errors (LWE) or Short Integer
Solution (SIS). Moreover, many advanced cryptographic functionalities (like full
homomorphism [19]), which are elusive in the discrete logarithm setting, are
enabled by these assumptions.
In this paper, we describe the first lattice-based realization of group signatures
with message-dependent opening.
Related Work. The pioneering work of Chaum an Van Heyst [16] inspired
many group signature candidates in the nineties but practical and scalable
constructions only came out in 2000. The first group signature that was both
scalable and collusion-resistant was proposed by Ateniese, Camenisch, Joye and
Tsudik [3] under the Strong RSA assumption. At that time, however, there
was no precise definition of what it meant for a group signature to be secure.
Security analyses were indeed conducted with respect to lists of sometimes
redundant requirements. This state-of-affairs changed with the work of Bellare,
Micciancio and Warinschi [5] who proposed a model synthesizing the security
requirements into two properties named anonymity and traceability. In this model,
Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [7] put forth a practical construction with very short
signatures based on pairing-related assumptions. While the solution of [7] was
in the random oracle model, constructions in the standard model came out in
several works [10,11,24] inspired by the Groth-Sahai methodology [25].
Sakai et al. introduced the message-dependent opening functionality [42] in
2012. In their work, they provided evidence that GS-MDO schemes imply identity-
based encryption (IBE) [43,8]. In the random oracle model, Ohara et al. [37]
subsequently designed efficient GS-MDO schemes [37] based on non-standard
assumptions in groups with a bilinear map. Libert and Joye [30] appealed to the
same tools and the machinery of Groth-Sahai proofs [25] to build a GS-MDO
system in the standard model.
While group signatures have attracted much attention in cryptography for
many years, the first lattice-based proposal only appeared in 2010 in the work
of Gordon, Katz and Vaikuntanathan [22]. While a simple counting argument
suggests that no group signature can contain less than logN bits (where N is the
number of group members), the Gordon et al. [22] construction had signatures
of linear size in N . The desired logarithmic size was reached by Laguillaumie et
al. [29] whose solution still remained quite costly. Although several substantial
improvements were recently achieved [34,36,32], lattice-based group signatures
are not yet competitive with pairing-based solutions. One of the cited reasons
explaining this efficiency gap is the fact that zero-knowledge proofs [21] for
lattice-related languages [21,33,6] remain less effective than those in groups with
a bilinear map, where the rich underlying algebraic structure has proven very
useful [25]. An illustration of the limited amount of algebraic structure of lattices is
the absence of non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs outside the random
oracle model in the lattice setting (except for very specific languages [40]).
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Even in the random oracle model, the design of lattice-based group signatures
with extra properties remains a non-trivial problem. In particular, no GS-MDO
system has been proposed so far. In fact, except the theoretical construction of
Sakai et al. [42], all existing solutions [42,37,30] rely on bilinear maps. For the
sake of not putting all one’s eggs in the same basket, it is thus important to seek
constructions based on different assumptions.
Our Contribution. We propose the first GS-MDO realization based on stand-
ard lattice assumptions. The security of our scheme is proved in the random oracle
model under SIS and LWE assumptions. We design this scheme by extending
the group signature scheme of Ling, Nguyen and Wang [34], which is recalled
in Appendix C.1. Not only does this scheme provide one of the most efficient
candidates so far, its built-in zero-knowledge arguments turn out to be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate our statements in the setting of message-dependent
openings. Like [34], our construction proceeds by having each group member’s
signing key consist of a Boyen [9] signature for his identity d ∈ {0, 1}`. To sign
a message M , the user encrypt his identity d using an IND-CCA encryption
scheme derived from the Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan (GPV) IBE [20] via
the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) paradigm [14]. Then, the user provides a ZK
argument of possession of a Boyen signature for the message encrypted by the
ciphertext, the message being embedded in the Fiat-Shamir challenge to make
the proof non-interactive. Our scheme takes advantage of the fact that Ling et
al. [34] used an IBE to encrypt the group member’s identifier. We add a second
encryption layer in order to encrypt the ciphertext under the identityM , which is
the message to be signed. Therefore, the GS-MDO functionality can be achieved
by combining two instances of the GPV IBE (one for the admitter and the
second one for the opening authority). To reveal a message-specific token tM , the
admitter can simply output a private key for the identity M , then allowing the
opener to retrieve the ciphertext hiding the identity. Then, using the encryption
layer as in the Ling et al. scheme [34] allows us to adapt the underlying argument
system to our purpose.
Now, the challenge is to prove that the entire double-encryption process was
conducted properly. To this end, we can leverage the properties of Stern-like
protocols [44] and translate the statements to be proved so as to apply the
recently proposed framework of [31]. Our argument system, while addressing a
more elaborate relation than in [34], is constructed in a simpler and more modular
manner. In short, we reduce the entire statement into an assertion of the form
P · x = v mod q, where P is a public matrix that depends on the group public
key and the outer ciphertext layer, while x is a short vector which is constructed
from the witness and has a special structure.
We can also notice that our technique can be used to enable message-dependent
opening in the case of dynamically growing groups as well. For instance, the
two-layer encryption method can be straightforwardly adapted to the dynamic
group signature scheme from Libert et al. [31] which is also built upon the Ling et
al. scheme [34] and also relies on Stern-like ZK arguments.
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Roadmap. To present our results, the rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we first recall the necessary definitions and security notions. The
supporting zero-knowledge argument system is constructed in Section 3. In
Section 4, we present our lattice-based GS-MDO scheme.
2 Background
Notations. Matrices are denoted with bold upper-case letters A and vectors in
bold lower-case letters x. We assume that all vectors are column vectors. The
concatenation of vectors x ∈ Rk and y ∈ Rm is denoted by (x‖y) ∈ Rk+m. We
denote the column concatenation of matrices A ∈ Rn×k and B ∈ Rn×m by [A|B].
If dimensions are compatible, 〈u,v〉 denote the inner product of vectors u and
v. The identity matrix of order k is denoted by Ik, and 0` stands for the zero
vector of dimension `. If A is a full column rank matrix, we let A˜ denote its
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. If u ∈ Rn, its Euclidean norm is denoted by
‖b‖ and this notation is extended to matrices A ∈ Rn×m with columns (ai)i≤m
by ‖A‖ = maxi≤m ‖ai‖. Finally, PPT stands for Probabilistic Polynomial-Time.
2.1 Lattices
A lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of some space Rn, which can be seen as the set
of integer linear combinations of linearly independent vectors (bi)i≤n. Over a
lattice Λ, and given a parameter σ ∈ R∗+, we define the Gaussian distribution of
support Λ and parameter σ by DΛ,σ[b] ∼ exp
(−pi‖b‖2/σ2), for all b ∈ Λ. We
will use the fact that samples from DΛ,σ are short with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 1 ([4, Le. 1.5]). For any lattice Λ ⊆ Rn and positive real number σ,
we have Prb←↩DΛ,σ [‖b‖ ≤
√
nσ] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(n).
Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [20] show that it is possible to efficiently
sample from a Gaussian distribution on a lattice support given a sufficiently
short basis of this lattice.
Lemma 2 ([12, Le. 2.3]). There exists a PPT algorithm GPVSample that takes
as inputs a basis B of a lattice Λ ⊆ Zn and rational σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ ·Ω(√logn), and
outputs vectors b ∈ Λ with distribution DΛ,σ.
Definition 1. Let m ≥ n ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2. For a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and a vector
u ∈ Znq , define Λq(A) := {x ∈ Zm : ∃s ∈ Zn s.t. AT · s = x mod q} and
Λ⊥q (A) := {x ∈ Zm : A · x = 0 mod q}, Λuq (A) := {x ∈ Zm : A · x = u mod q}.
We also use an algorithm that jointly samples an uniform matrix A and a
short basis of the lattice Λ⊥q (A).
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Lemma 3 ([2, Th. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm GenTrap that takes
as inputs 1n, 1m and an integer q ≥ 2 with m ≥ Ω(n log q), and outputs a
matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) such that A is within statistical
distance 2−Ω(n) to U(Zn×mq ), and ‖T˜A‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q).
The description of our scheme also uses an algorithm that extends a trapdoor
for A ∈ Zn×mq to a trapdoor of any B ∈ Zn×m
′
q whose left n×m submatrix is A.
Lemma 4 ([15, Le. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm ExtBasis that takes
as inputs a matrix B ∈ Zn×m′q whose first m columns span Znq , and a basis TA
of Λ⊥q (A) where A is the left n ×m submatrix of B, and outputs a basis TB
of Λ⊥q (B) with ‖T˜B‖ ≤ ‖T˜A‖.
2.2 Hardness assumptions
We prove the security of our scheme in the ROM among the assumption that both
algorithmic problems below are hard, in the sense that they cannot be solved by
any PPT algorithm with non-negligible probability nor advantage respectively.
Definition 2. Let m, q, β be functions of a parameter n. The Short Integer
Solution problem SISm,q,β is as follows: Given A←↩ U(Zn×mq ), find x ∈ Λ⊥q (A)
with 0 < ‖x‖ ≤ β.
Definition 3. Let q, α be functions of a parameter n. For s ∈ Znq (a secret),
the distribution Aq,α,s over Znq × Zq is obtained by sampling a ←↩ U(Znq ) and
(a noise) e ←↩ DZ,αq, and returning (a, 〈a, s〉 + e). The Learning With Errors
problem LWEq,α is as follows: For s ←↩ U(Znq ), distinguish between arbitrarily
many independent samples from U(Znq ×Zq) and the same number of independent
samples from Aq,α,s.
If q ≥ √nβ and m,β ≤ poly(n), then standard worst-case lattice problems
with approximation factors γ = O˜(β√n) reduce to SISm,q,β (see for instance [20,
Se. 9]). Similarly, if αq = Ω(
√
n), then standard worst-case lattice problems with
approximation factors γ = O(α/n) quantumly reduce to LWEq,α (see [41] as well
as [38,12] for classical analogues).
2.3 Group Signature with Message Dependent Opening
We use the syntax of Sakai et al. [42] to describe a GS-MDO, which extends the
model of Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [5].
Definition 4 (GS-MDO). A group signature with message-dependent opening
is a tuple of algorithms (Keygen,Sign,Verify,TrapGen,Open) such that:
Keygen(1λ, 1N ): Given a security parameter λ and the number of group members
N , outputs the group public key gpk, the opening key ok, the the admitter’s
private key mskADM, and a vector of user secret keys gsk = (gsk[d])N−1d=0 .
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Sign(gpk,gsk[d],M): Given an user d secret key gsk[d] and a message M , issue
a signature Σ for the message M .
Verify(gpk,M,Σ): Given a message M and a signature Σ, output 0 or 1.
TrapGen(gpk,mskADM,M): Given the admitter key mskADM, and a message M ,
output a token tM .
Open(gpk, ok, tM ,M,Σ): Given the opening key ok, a message M , a token tM
for this message, and a signature Σ, return either d ∈ N, or ⊥.
These algorithms must also verify the correctness property, meaning that
for all (gpk,gsk, ok,mskADM)← Keygen(1λ, 1N ), for all d ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, and
for all M ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have w.h.p. Verify(gpk,M, Sign(gpk,gsk[d],M)) = 1 and
Open(gpk, ok,TrapGen(gpk,mskADM,M),M, Sign(gpk,gsk[d],M)) = d.
Like in a classical group signature, the scheme must verify Traceability and
Anonymity, but since the opening capability is split in two entities, namely the
admitter and the opening authority (also known as the group manager), they
therefore are two anonymity definitions: the Opener Anonymity and the Admitter
Anonymity, which are formalized as follows.
Definition 5 (Traceability). A GS-MDO scheme provides full traceability if,
for any λ ∈ N, any N ∈ poly(λ) and any PPT adversary A involved in the
experiment below, it holds that AdvtraceA (λ) = Pr[ExptraceA (λ,N) = 1] ∈ negl(λ).
ExptraceA (λ,N)
(gpk, ok,mskADM,gsk)← Keygen(λ,N)
st← (ok,mskADM, gpk) ; C ← ∅ ; K ← ε ; Cont← true
while (Cont = true) do
(Cont, st, j)← ASign(gsk[·],·)(choose, st,K)
if Cont = true then C ← C ∪ {j} ; K ← K ∪ {gsk[j]} end if
(M?, σ?)← ASign(gsk[·],·)(guess, st)
if Verify(gpk,M?, σ?) = 0 then Return 0
if Open(gpk, ok,TrapGen(gpk,mskADM,M?),M?, σ?) =⊥ then Return 1
if ∃j? ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} such that
(Open(gpk, ok, tM? ,M?, σ?) = j?) ∧ (j? /∈ C) ∧ ((j?,M?) not queried by A)
with tM? ← TrapGen(gpk,mskADM,M?)
then Return 1 else Return 0
Definition 6 (Admitter Anonymity). A GS-MDO scheme provides full an-
onymity against the admitter if, for any λ ∈ N, any N ∈ poly(λ) and any PPT
adversary A involved in the experiment hereunder, we have
Advanon-admA (λ) = |Pr[Expanon-admA (λ,N) = 1]− 1/2| ∈ negl(λ).
Expanon−admA (λ,N)
(gpk, ok,mskADM,gsk)← Keygen(λ,N)
(st, j0, j1,M?)← AOok(choose, gpk,gsk,mskADM)
b←↩ {0, 1}; σ? ← Sign(gpk,gsk[jb],M?)
b′ ← AOok(guess, st, σ?)
Return 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise
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Here, Ook is an oracle that takes as input an arbitrary signature σ 6= σ? and
uses ok and mskADM to return the identity of the signer.
Definition 7 (Opener Anonymity). A GS-MDO scheme provides full an-
onymity against the opener if, for any λ ∈ N, any N ∈ poly(λ) and any PPT
adversary A involved in the experiment below, it holds that
Advanon-oaA (λ) = |Pr[Expanon-oaA (λ,N) = 1]− 1/2| ∈ negl(λ).
Expanon−oaA (λ,N)
(gpk, ok,mskADM,gsk)← Keygen(λ,N)
(st, j0, j1,M?)← AOmskADM (choose, gpk,gsk, ok)
b←↩ {0, 1}; σ? ← Sign(gpk,gsk[jb],M?)
b′ ← AOmskADM (guess, st, σ?)
Return 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise
In the above notation, OmskADM(.) is an oracle that returns trapdoors for
arbitrary messages M 6= M? chosen by the adversary.
2.4 Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
We will work with statistical zero-knowledge argument systems, namely, inter-
active protocols where the zero-knowledge property holds against any cheat-
ing verifier, while the soundness property only holds against computationally
bounded cheating provers. More formally, let the set of statements-witnesses
R = {(y, w)} ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ be an NP relation. A two-party game 〈P,V〉 is
called an interactive argument system for the relation R with soundness error e
if the following two conditions hold:
– Completeness. If (y, w) ∈ R then Pr[〈P(y, w),V(y)〉 = 1] = 1.
– Soundness. For any PPT P̂, if (y, w) 6∈ R, then Pr[〈P̂(y, w),V(y)〉 = 1] ≤ e.
An argument system is called statistical zero-knowledge if for any V̂(y), there
exists a PPT simulator S(y) producing a simulated transcript that is statistically
close to the one of the real interaction between P(y, w) and V̂(y). A related notion
is argument of knowledge, which requires the witness-extended emulation property.
For protocols consisting of 3 moves (i.e., commitment-challenge-response), witness-
extended emulation is implied by special soundness [23], where the latter assumes
that there exists a PPT extractor which takes as input a set of valid transcripts
with respect to all possible values of the ‘challenge’ to the same ‘commitment’,
and outputs w′ such that (y, w′) ∈ R.
Our statistical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge (sZKAoK) are Stern-
type [44]. In particular, they are Σ-protocols in the generalized sense defined
in [26,6] (where 3 valid transcripts are needed for extraction, instead of just 2).
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3 The Underlying Zero-Knowledge Argument System
First of all, we recall that the protocol from [34] allows prover P to convince
verifier V in ZK that P knows a valid message-signature pair (d, z) for Boyen’s
signature scheme [9], and that the binary representation of d is honestly encrypted
to a given ciphertext pair (c1, c2). The strategy in [34] was to extend Stern’s
protocol [44] (via the Decomposition-Extension technique [33]) to prove the
statement in a ad-hoc manner. However, their argument system was rather
complicated, which makes it somewhat inflexible to be used as a sub-protocol in
designing more advanced constructions.
The goal of this section is to construct the statistical zero-knowledge argument
of knowledge (sZKAoK) underlying the GS-MDO scheme of Section 4. In our
setting, the ciphertext component c2 is hidden, and P can additionally prove that
the secret bits representing c2 are correctly encrypted to another given ciphertext
pair (cˆ1, cˆ2). By using the new strategy for Stern-like protocols, recently proposed
in [31], we can handle the extended relation, yet the resulting argument system
is obtained in a simpler and more modular manner than in [34].
More formally, let n,m, `, q, β, b be positive integers and k = dlog qe. Let
H = I` ⊗
(
1 | 2 | 4 | · · · | 2k−1) ∈ Z`×`kq , and let bin : Z`q → {0, 1}`k be the
function mapping w to its component-wise binary decomposition bin(w). (Note
that for all w ∈ Z`q, we have H · bin(w) = w.) We define as well the binary
decomposition function for integer bin : N→ {0, 1}?.
The relation Rgsmdo associated with our protocol is then defined as follows.
Definition 8. Define
Rgsmdo =
{
(A, {Ai}`i=0,B,C,G, Gˆ,u, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2),d, z, s, sˆ, e1, eˆ1, e2, eˆ2, c2
}
as a relation where
A, {Ai}`i=0,B,C∈Zn×mq ; G∈Zn×`q ; Gˆ∈Zn×`kq ; u∈Znq ; c1, cˆ1 ∈Zmq ; cˆ2 ∈Z`kq ;
d = (d1, . . . , d`) ∈ {0, 1}`; z ∈ [−β, β]2m; s, sˆ ∈ [−b, b]n; e1, eˆ1 ∈ [−b, b]m;
e2 ∈ [−b, b]`; eˆ2 ∈ [−b, b]`k; c2 ∈ Z`q
satisfy
[
A|A0 +
∑`
i=1
di ·Ai
] · z = u mod q (1)
c1 = B> · s+ e1 mod q; c2 = G> · s+ e2 +
⌊q
2
⌋
· d mod q (2)
cˆ1 = C> · sˆ+ eˆ1 mod q; cˆ2 = Gˆ> · sˆ+ eˆ2 +
⌊q
2
⌋
· bin(c2) mod q. (3)
In Section 3.1, we present Stern’s protocol from a high-level point of view,
according to the abstraction of [31]. Then, via the transformations performed in
Section 3.2, we show how to obtain a ZKAoK for Rgsmdo based on this abstract
protocol.
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3.1 Stern’s Protocol, from a High-Level Viewpoint
Let D,L, q ≥ 2 be positive integers and let VALID be a subset of {−1, 0, 1}L.
Suppose that S is a finite set such that one can associate every pi ∈ S with a
permutation Tpi of L elements, satisfying the following condition:
x ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Tpi(x) ∈ VALID. (4)
We aim to construct a sZKAoK for the following abstract relation:
Rabstract =
{
(P,v),x ∈ ZD×Lq × ZDq × VALID : P · x = v mod q.
}
Note that, Stern’s original protocol corresponds to the special case when
VALID = {x ∈ {0, 1}L : wt(x) = k} (where wt(·) denotes the Hamming weight
and k < L is a given integer), S = SL - hereunder the set of all permutations
of L elements, and Tpi(x) = pi(x).
The equivalence in (4) plays a crucial role in proving in ZK that x ∈ VALID:
To do so P samples pi ←↩ U(S) and let V check that Tpi(x) ∈ VALID, while the
later cannot learn any additional information about x thanks to the randomness
of pi. Furthermore, to prove in ZK that the linear equation holds, P samples a
masking vector r ←↩ U(ZLq ), sends y = x + r mod q, and convinces V instead
that P · y = P · r+ v mod q.
The interactive protocol between P(P,v,x) and V(P,v), which employs a
statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme COM
(e.g., the SIS-based one from [27]), is described in Figure 1.
1. Commitment: P samples r←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S) and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for
COM. Then P sends the commitment CMT =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
to V, where
C1 = COM(pi,P · r; ρ1), C2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C3 = COM(Tpi(x+ r); ρ3).
2. Challenge: V sends a challenge Ch←↩ U({1, 2, 3}) to P.
3. Response: Depending on Ch, P sends the response RSP computed as follows:
– Ch = 1: Let tx = Tpi(x), tr = Tpi(r), and RSP = (tx, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Let pi2 = pi, y = x+ r, and RSP = (pi2,y, ρ1, ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Let pi3 = pi, r3 = r, and RSP = (pi3, r3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: Receiving RSP, the verifier proceeds as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that tx ∈ VALID and C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tx + tr; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(pi2,P · y− v; ρ1), C3 = COM(Tpi2(y); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(pi3,P · r3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Tpi3(r3); ρ2).
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Figure 1: A ZKAoK for the relation Rabstract.
The properties of the given protocol is summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 5. The protocol in Figure 1 is a sZKAoK for the relation Rabstract with
perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(L log q).
In particular:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input (P,v), outputs an accepted
transcript which is statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of
the challenge Ch, outputs x′ ∈ VALID such that P · x′ = v mod q.
The proof of Lemma 5 employs standard simulation and extraction techniques
for Stern-type protocols [27,33,34,18,32]. We defer it to Appendix B.
3.2 From Rgsmdo to Rabstract
We show that a sZKAoK for relation Rgsmdo in Definition 8 can be derived from
the one for relation Rabstract from Section 3.1. In the process, we employ the
Decomposition-Extension technique from [33], which we will formalize as follows.
– For any positive integer i, denote by B2i the set of all vectors in {0, 1}2i having
exactly i coordinates equal to 1, and denote by B3i the set of all vectors in
{−1, 0, 1}3i having exactly i coordinates equal to j, for every j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
– Define, for any integer B > 0, the number δB := blogBc+1 and the sequence
B1, . . . , BδB , where Bj =
⌊
B+2j−1
2j
⌋
for all j ∈ [δB]. As noted in [33], this
sequence satisfies
∑δB
j=1Bj = B, and any integer in [−B,B] can be expressed
as a linear combination of the Bj ’s with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
– Define the following matrices for any positive integers m, B:
Hm,B =

B1 . . . BδB
B1 . . . BδB
. . .
B1 . . . BδB
 ∈ Zm×mδB ,
and H∗m,B =
[
Hm,B
∣∣0m×2mδB] ∈ Zm×3mδB .
Lemma 6 (Decomposition-Extension). Let m, B be positive integers. Then,
there exists an efficient algorithm that on input vector v ∈ [−B,B]m, outputs
vector v∗ ∈ B3mδB such that H∗m,B · v∗ = v.
Proof. Let v = (v1, . . . , vm), where vi ∈ [−B,B] for all i ∈ [m]. For each i, one
can efficiently find vi,1, . . . , vi,δB ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that
∑δB
j=1Bj · vi,j = vi.
Let v′ = (v1,1, . . . , v1,δB , v2,1, . . . , v2,δB , . . . , vm,1, . . . , vm,δB ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mδB ,
then Hm,B · v′ = v. By appending 2mδB suitable coordinates to v′, one can
obtain a vector v∗ ∈ B3mδB such that H∗m,B · v∗ = v. uunionsq
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We now transform equations in Definition 8 into a unified equation of the
form P·x = v mod q. Regarding Equation (1), if we write z as z = (z1‖z2), where
z1, z2 ∈ [−β, β]m, and let z∗1, z∗2 ∈ B3mδβ be the vectors obtained by applying
Lemma 6 to z1, z2, respectively, then we have:
u =
[
A|A0 +
∑`
i=1
di ·Ai
] · z = A · z1 +A0 · z2 + ∑`
i=1
di ·Ai · z2 mod q
= (A ·H∗m,β) · z∗1 + (A0 ·H∗m,β) · z∗2 +
∑`
i=1
(Ai ·H∗m,β) · (di · z∗2) mod q
= A · z¯ mod q,
where{
A =
[
A ·H∗m,β |A0 ·H∗m,β |A1 ·H∗m,β | . . . |A` ·H∗m,β
] ∈ Zn×(`+2)3mδβq
z¯ =
(
z∗1‖z∗2‖d1 · z∗2‖ . . . ‖d` · z∗2
) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(`+2)3mδβ .
Next, we extend d = (d1, . . . , d`) to d∗ = (d1, . . . , d`, d`+1, . . . , d2`) ∈ B2`, and let
z∗ =
(
z¯‖d`+1 · z∗2‖ . . . ‖d2` · z∗2
)
and A∗=
[
A |0n×`3mδβ ] ∈ Zn×(2`+2)3mδβq , then
we have the following equation:
A∗ · z∗ = u mod q. (5)
Meanwhile, we observe that (2) and (3) can be unified in the following form:
0
b q2cI`
0
0
d+

0
−H
0
b q2cI`k
 bin(c2) +

B>
G>
Im+` 0
0
C>
Gˆ>
Im+`k


s
e1
e2
sˆ
eˆ1
eˆ2
 =

c1
0`
cˆ1
cˆ2
 .
For simplicity, we define n1 = 2m+ `+ `k and m1 = 2m+ 2n+ `+ `k. In
the above unified equation, let F1 ∈ Zn1×`q , F2 ∈ Zn1×`kq , and F3 ∈ Zn1×m1q be
the matrices associated with d, bin(c2), and e =
(
s‖e1‖e2‖sˆ‖eˆ1‖eˆ1
) ∈ [−b, b]m1 ,
respectively. Let c =
(
c1‖0`‖cˆ1‖cˆ2
) ∈ Zn1q , then the equation becomes:
F1 · d+ F2 · bin(c2) + F3 · e = c mod q.
We then extend bin(c2) ∈ {0, 1}`k to vector bin∗(c2)∈B2`k, and apply Lemma 6
to vector e to obtain e∗ ∈ B3m1δb . Furthermore, let y∗ =
(
d∗‖bin∗(c2)‖e∗
)
, and
F∗ =
[
F1|0n1×`|F2|0n1×nk|F3 ·H∗m1,b
] ∈ Zn1×(2`+2`k+3m1δb)q , then we have:
F∗ · y∗ = c mod q. (6)
In the last step of our transformations, we let L = (2`+ 2)3mδβ + 2`+ 2`k +
3m1δb and D = n + n1, and define matrix P =
(
A∗ 0
0 F∗
)
∈ ZD×Lq , vector
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x =
(
z∗
y∗
)
∈ {−1, 0, 1}L, vector v =
(
u
c
)
∈ ZDq .
Equations (5) and (6) are now unified as:
P · x = v mod q. (7)
Having obtained the desired equation (7), we now specify the set VALID to
which x belongs, the set S and permutations of L elements {Tpi : pi ∈ S} for
which the equivalence (4) holds.
– VALID: the set of all vectors t ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L having the form:
t =
(
t1‖t2‖g1 · x2‖ . . . ‖g2` · t2‖g‖t3‖t4
)
for some t1, t2 ∈ B3mδβ , g = (g1, . . . , g2`) ∈ B2`, t3 ∈ B2`k, t4 ∈ B3m1δb .
– S = S3mδβ × S3mδβ × S2` × S2`k × S3m1δb .
– For pi = (φ, ψ, τ, σ, η) ∈ S and w = (wˆ‖w˜‖w1‖ . . . ‖w2`‖w¯‖w¨‖w˘) ∈ ZLq ,
where wˆ, w˜,w1, . . . ,w2` ∈ Z3mδβq , w¯ ∈ Z2`q , w¨ ∈ Z2`kq , w˘ ∈ Z3m1δbq , we
define:
Tpi(w) =
(
φ(wˆ)‖ψ(w˜)‖ψ(wτ(1))‖ . . . ‖ψ(wτ(2`))‖τ(w¯)‖σ(w¨)‖η(w˘)
)
as the permutation that transforms w as follows:
1. It rearranges the order of the 2` blocks w1, . . . ,w2` according to τ .
2. It then permutes block wˆ according to φ, blocks w˜, {wi}2`i=1 according
to ψ, block w¯ according to τ , block w¨ according to σ, and block w˘ via η.
By inspection, it can be seen that
x =
(
z∗1‖z∗2‖d1 · z∗2‖ . . . ‖d2` · z∗2‖d∗‖bin∗(c2)‖e∗
) ∈ VALID,
and that the property (4) is satisfied, as desired. As a result, we can obtain a
sZKAoK for Rgsmdo by running the protocol in Figure 1 with common input
(P,v) and prover’s input x.
Putting everything together, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists a Stern-type ZKAoK for the relation Rgsmdo with
perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O(L log q).
In particular:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input (A, {Ai}`i=0,B,C,G, Gˆ,u,
c1, cˆ1, cˆ2), outputs an accepted transcript which is statistically close to that
produced by the real prover.
– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of
the challenge Ch, outputs a tuple (d′, z′, s′, sˆ′, e′1, eˆ′1, e′2, eˆ′2, c′2) such that:(
(A, {Ai}`i=0,B,C,G, Gˆ,u, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2),d′, z′, s′, sˆ′, e′1, eˆ′1, e′2, eˆ′2, c′2
) ∈ Rgsmdo.
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward. For simulation, we run the simulator
of Lemma 5. For extraction, we run the knowledge extractor of Lemma 5, and
then “backtrack” the described above transformations to obtain a satisfying
witness for Rgsmdo. We thus omit the details.
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4 A GS-MDO Scheme based on Lattice Assumptions
Our scheme is described and analyzed in the model of Sakai et al. [42], which is
described in Section 2.3.
Our GS-MDO scheme builds on the Ling et al. [34] group signature, which is
recalled in Appendix C.1. In order to enable message-dependent openings, we
add an encryption layer to the previous scheme using an IBE where the signed
message serves as the receiver’s identity. The admitter, which holds the master
secret key for this IBE, is able to derive a message-specific token consisting of an
IBE private key for this “identity”. By itself, this information is insufficient to
open the signature as it uncovers a second ciphertext embedded in the message
space of the initial encryption layer. At the same time, the opening authority only
has access to the external encryption layer which prevents it from identifying the
signer without the message-specific token.
Now, the challenge is to prove that the entire double-encryption process was
conducted properly while proving the knowledge of a Boyen signature at the
same time. As demonstrated in Section 3, we solve this challenge by leveraging
the properties of Stern-like protocols [44] and translating the statements to be
proved so as to apply the technique of Section 3.
To encrypt the user’s identity d ∈ {0, 1}`, we apply a multi-bit variant of the
dual Regev system [20] and obtain a first-layer encryption
(c1, c2) =
(
BT s+ e1,GT s+ e2 + bq/2c · bin(d)
)
,
where B ∈ Zn×mq is the master public key of the underlying IBE, e1, e2 are small
noise vectors and G ∈ H1(ovk) ∈ Zn×`q is derived by hashing a one-time signature
verification key (recall that, as in [34], we achieve anonymity in the CCA2 sense
by applying the CHK paradigm [14] using ovk as the receiver’s identity). Then,
we use a second IBE layer to encrypt the binary decomposition of c2 ∈ Z`q. In
this second IBE instance, we use a matrix C ∈ Zn×mq and compute
(cˆ1, cˆ2) =
(
CT sˆ+ eˆ1, GˆT sˆ+ eˆ2 + bq/2c · bin(c2)
)
,
for suitable noise vectors eˆ1, eˆ2 and where Gˆ = H2(M) ∈ Zn×`dlog qeq is an IBE
public key obtained by hashing the “identity” M . (Note that the two IBE layers
use distinct random oracles H1 and H2.)
Now, the problem is to demonstrate the proper computation of (c1, c2) and
(cˆ1, cˆ2). This can be achieved by proving knowledge of bin(c2) ∈ {0, 1}`dlog qe,
s, sˆ ∈ Zn, e1, eˆ1 ∈ Zm, e2 ∈ Z`, e2 ∈ Z`dlog qe satisfying:
BT Im 0 0 0
−GT 0 −I` H −bq/2c · I`
CT Im 0 0
GˆT I`dlog qe bq/2c · I`dlog qe 0
·

s
e1e2
sˆ
eˆ1
eˆ2
bin(c2)
bin(d)
 =

c1
0`
cˆ1
cˆ2
 ,
where H is defined as in Section 3. The second and fourth block relations ensure
that that c2 is the message encrypted by cˆ2 while this hidden c2 encrypts bin(d).
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We are left with arguing knowledge of a Boyen signature on bin(d) ∈ {0, 1}`,
which can be achieved as in [34].
4.1 Description of the Scheme
The parameters are set in such a way that the Boyen signature and the GPV IBE
scheme function properly and are secure. Let n = O(λ) be the lattice parameter,
N = 2` = poly(λ) be the number of group members, q = O(` · n2) be a prime
modulus, β = O˜(√`n) be the infinity norm bound for signatures generated by
Boyen’s scheme [9], and b such that q/b = ` · O˜(n) be the infinity norm bound
for LWE noises sampled from error distribution χ.
Keygen(1λ, 1N ): This algorithm performs the following steps:
1. Generate a verification key (A,A0, . . . ,A`,u) ∈ (Zn×mq )`+2 × Znq and a
private key TA ∈ Zm×m for Boyen’s signature scheme.
Then for each d ∈ {0, . . . , 2` − 1}, define the corresponding private key
gsk[d] = (vTd,1 | vTd,2)T ∈ Z2m to be the Boyen’s signature for the message
bin(d) = (d1, . . . , d`) ∈ {0, 1}` using the trapdoor TA.
2. Generate two encryption and decryption key pairs for the GPV-IBE
scheme: the matrix B ∈ Zn×mq along with its trapdoor basis TB ∈ Zm×m
and the matrix C ∈ Zn×mq with its trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m using the
GenTrap algorithm from Gentry et al. [20] described in Lemma 3.
3. Select a strong one-time signature ΠOTS = (OKeygen,OSign,OVer) and
hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×`q , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×`dlog qeq .
4. Output ok = TB, mskADM = TC, gsk =
(
gsk[d]
)N−1
d=0 and
gpk =
{
A, {Ai}`i=0,u,B,C,ΠOTS,H1,H2
}
,
Sign(gpk,gsk[d],M): To sign M using a group private key gsk[d],
1. Generate a key pair (ovk, osk)← OKeygen(1λ) for the signature ΠOTS.
2. Encrypt the message d with respect to the “identity” ovk using the GPV
IBE [20]. Namely, let G = H1(ovk) ∈ Zn×`q . Sample s ←↩ χn; e1 ←↩
χm; e2 ←↩ χ`, and compute the ciphertext(
c1 = BT s+ e1, c2 = GT s+ e2 + bq/2c · bin(d)
) ∈ Zmq × Z`q.
3. Using the GPV IBE again, encrypt the ciphertext c2 w.r.t the “identity”
M . In other words, let Gˆ = H2(M) ∈ Zn×`dlog qeq , then sample sˆ ←↩
χn; eˆ1 ←↩ χm, eˆ2 ←↩ χ`dlog qe and compute the ciphertext(
cˆ1 = CT sˆ+ eˆ1, cˆ2 = GˆT sˆ+ eˆ2 + bq/2c · bin(c2)
) ∈ Zmq × Z`dlog qeq .
4. Generate a NIZKAoK Π to prove the possession of a valid message-
signature pair (d, z) for Boyen’s signature, and that (cˆ1, cˆ2) is a cor-
rect encryption of c2 under the identity M , where (c1, c2) is a cor-
rect encryption of d = bin(d) under the identity ovk. To do this, run
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the interactive argument system for the relation Rgsmdo in Section 3
with public input (A, {Ai}`i=0,B,C,G, Gˆ,u, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2) and prover’s in-
put (d, z, s, sˆ, e1, eˆ1, e2, eˆ2, c2).
The protocol is repeated t = ω(logn) times to get a negligible soundness
error, and then made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic,
which gives Π =
({Commj}tj=1,Chall, {Respj}tj=1), where
Chall = H(M, ovk, {Commj}tj=1, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2) ∈ {1, 2, 3}t.
5. Compute a one-time signature sig = OSign(osk; c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π).
6. Output Σ =
(
ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π, sig
)
.
Verify(gpk,M,Σ): Σ = (ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π, sig
)
is verified w.r.t. M as follows:
1. If OVer(ovk; sig; c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π) = 0, return 0.
2. Verify the validity of the proof Π, if it fails, return 0.
3. If everything went correctly, then return 1.
TrapGen(gpk,mskADM,M): To generate a token tM .
1. If a token for a message M was already queried, answer consistently.
2. Otherwise, derive a key for the identity M using the master secret key
TC ∈ Zm×m. Namely compute Gˆ = H2(M), then using SamplePre,
compute a small-norm matrix EM ∈ Zm×`dlog qe such that C ·EM = Gˆ.
3. Output tM = EM .
Open(gpk, ok, tM , Σ,M): To open Σ(ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π, sig
)
using the opening
key ok and the token for the message tM , do the following:
1. Decrypt (cˆ1, cˆ2) using tM : c2 = H ·
⌊
(cˆ2 − tMT · cˆ1) · (q/2)
⌉
.
2. Decrypt (c1, c2) using ok = TB ∈ Zm×m, namely compute G = H1(ovk),
and using SamplePre to get a short-norm matrix F ∈ Zm×` such that
B · F = G, and finally compute
d =
(
1 | 2 | 4 | · · · | 2`−1) · ⌊(c2 − FT · c1) · (q/2)⌉ .
3. Verify that d belongs to a valid user, if not return ⊥, otherwise return d.
4.2 Security
The security of the above construction has been proven in the ROM under LWE
and SIS assumptions as evidenced in the following theorems. The proofs of
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 are available in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. In the random oracle model, the above group signature scheme is
fully traceable under the assumption that the SIS problem is hard.
Theorem 3. The above group signature scheme is fully anonymous against the
admitter under the LWE assumption, and assuming that the one-time signature
scheme ΠOTS is strongly unforgeable.
Theorem 4. The above group signature scheme is fully anonymous against the
opener under the LWE assumption.
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A Deferred Proofs of the GS-MDO Scheme
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2: Traceability
Proof. Our proof is similar to the proof of traceability in Ling et al. scheme [34]
since adding an additional encryption layer does not alter the power of the
reduction.
Let us assume that there exists a PPT adversary A with noticeable advantage
ε. By hypothesis, such an adversary can produce a valid signature (M?, Σ?)
which opens to ⊥ or a non-adversarially controlled user who did not sign M?. We
construct a reduction B that uses A to produce a forgery for Boyen’s signature
with advantage polynomially smaller than ε. Since Boyen’s signature is secure
under SIS assumption, this completes our proof.
Setup. The reduction B is given the verification key (A,A0, . . . ,A`,u) for
Boyen’s signature. It generates two key pairs (B,TB), (C,TC) for the GPV
IBE scheme and interacts with A by sending it gpk = {A,A0, . . . ,A`,u, B,C},
ok = TB and mskADM = TC.
Queries. Algorithm B initializes Qu ← ∅ and handles A’s queries as follow:
– Random Oracle Query. Queries on H,H1 and H2 are handled by consistently
returning uniformly random values in the respective ranges. In the following,
we denote by qk the answer to the k-th H-query.
– Private Key Query. In order to return a private key gsk[d] for user d, the
reduction B invokes its own signing oracle for Boyen’s signature of d : zd.
Then, B updates Qu ← Qu ∪ {d} and sends zd to A. It consistently returns
the same response in case a given identity is queried more than once.
– Signing Query. On signature query on a message M for user d, the reduction
B appeals to the simulator for the NIZKAoK protocol in order to produce
a signature Σ =
(
ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π ′, sig
)
. Namely, ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, sig are gen-
erated as in the real protocol while Π ′ is produced without the witnesses
by running the HVZK simulator of the underlying NIZKAoK t times and
programming the random oracle H accordingly. Thus, the HVZK property
of the argument system ensures that Σ is statistically indistinguishable from
a legitimate signature.
Main Reduction. At some point, A outputs a forgery(
M?, Σ? =
(
ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, ({Commj}tj=1,Chall, {Respj}tj=1), sig
))
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which satisfies the requirements of the traceability game in Definition 5.
The reduction B then exploits the forgery as follows. We can start by noticing that
Amust have queriedH on input (M, ovk, {Commj}tj=1, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2) since, otherwise,
the probability that (Chall)ti=1 = H(M, ovk, {Commj}tj=1, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2) is at most
3−t. With probability at least ε− 3−t, there thus exists an index κ∗ ≤ QH such
that the κ∗-th Oracle query involves the input (M, ovk, {Commj}tj=1, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2).
The reduction B then sets κ∗ as the forking point: namely, B replays A many
times with the same random tape and input as in the original run. In each
re-played execution, the first κ∗ − 1 queries receive exactly the same responses
r1, . . . , rκ∗−1 but, beyond that point, all following queries are replied with fresh
random values r′κ∗ , . . . , r′QH ←↩ U
({1, 2, 3}t).
The Improved Forking Lemma of Brickell et al. [13] ensures that with probab-
ility at least 1/2, B can obtain a 3-fork on H involving the same input tuple
(M, ovk, {Commj}tj=1, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2) with pairwise distinct outputs r(1)κ∗ , r(2)κ∗ , r(3)κ∗ ∈
{1, 2, 3}t after less than 32 ·QH/(ε−3−t) reruns of A. With probability 1−(7/9)t,
it can be shown that there exists an index j ∈ {1, . . . , t} for which the j-th bits of
r
(1)
κ∗ , r
(2)
κ∗ , r
(3)
κ∗ are {r(1)κ∗,j , r(2)κ∗,j , r(3)κ∗,j} = {1, 2, 3}. Since the corresponding responses
(Resp∗(1)j ,Resp
∗(2)
j ,Resp
∗(3)
j ) must be valid answers with respect to three distinct
challenges for the same commitment Commj . B can now use the knowledge
extractor of the underlying argument scheme to obtain witnesses(
d?, z?, s?, e?2, sˆ?, eˆ?1, eˆ?2
) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2m × Zn × Z` × Zn × Zm × Z`dlog qe,
such that the vector z? is a Boyen signature for the message d?. Moreover, as
required by the traceability game, we must have d? /∈ Qu, which implies that
(d?, z?) is a forgery for the Boyen signature. Finally, we can notice that, if A has
non-negligible success probability and runs in polynomial time, the same holds
for B. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3: Anonymity against the Admitter
Proof. In this proof, the attacker is given the private key of the external encryption
layer at the outset of the game. Since this key is also known to the challenger, we
can proceed as if this encryption layer did not exist in our proof. The proof thus
remains very similar to the proof of anonymity in [34]. Namely, we will proceed
via a sequence of games such that AdvA(Game 0) = ε in the first game and
AdvA(Game 6) = 0 in the last one. The indistinguishability of all adjacent games
is supported by the strong unforgeability of ΠOTS, the statistical ZK property of
the argument system and the hardness of LWE. For each i, we denote by Si the
event that the adversary wins in Game i.
Game 0. This is the real CCA anonymity game against the admitter: the challenger
runs Keygen(1λ, 1N ) to obtain (gpk, ok = TB,mskADM = TC,gsk), and then
sends (gpk,mskADM,gsk) to A. Using the decryption keys TB and TC, the chal-
lenger can answer all signature opening queries. In the challenge phase, A sends a
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messageM along with two identities d0 6= d1 ∈ {0, 1}`. The challenger sends back
a challenge signature Σ? =
(
ovk?, c?1, cˆ?1, cˆ?2, Π?, sig?
) ← Sign(gpk,gsk[db],M)
for b ∈ {0, 1}. After further queries, the adversary finally outputs a bit b′ ∈
{0, 1} and wins if b = b′. We denote by S0 the latter event. By hypothesis,
AdvA(Game 0) = |Pr[S0]− 1/2| = ε.
Game 1. In this game, we make a small modification with respect to Game 0. At
the outset of the game, the one-time signature key pair (ovk?, osk?) is generated by
the challenger. During the game, if A makes a request to open a valid signature of
the form
(
ovk?, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π, sig
)
, the challenger outputs a random bit and aborts.
However, the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature ΠOTS ensures that
this is unlikely to happen. Indeed, before the challenge phase, ovk? is independent
of A’s view, and the probability that ovk? appears in A’s queries is negligible.
Furthermore, after seeing the challenge signature Σ?, if A comes up with a
valid signature of the form
(
ovk?, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π, sig
)
, then sig must be a forged
one-time signature, which defeats the strong unforgeability of ΠOTS. Then, the
probability that the challenger aborts in this experiment is negligible and we
have |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ∈ negl(λ). In the upcoming experiments, we will assume
without loss of generality that A does not requests for opening of valid signature
that includes ovk?.
Game 2. We program the random oracle H1 in the following way. At the be-
ginning of the game, we choose an uniformly random matrix G? ∈ Zn×`q , and
set H1(ovk?) = G?. As for other queries, for each fresh H1 queries on ovk, the
challenger samples a small norm matrix Fovk ←↩ DmZ`,σ and programs the oracle
to have H1(ovk) = B ·Fovk and subsequent queries are answered consistently. At
each H1-query, the chosen matrix Fovk is retained for later use. Note that the
value H1(ovk) is statistically close to the uniform distribution, as in [20]. From
the attacker’s view, the output distribution of H1 thus remains the same as in
Game 2.
Game 3. In this game, we change the opening algorithm. At the beginning of
the game, instead of generating B with a trapdoor, the challenger samples a
random B? ∈ Zn×mq . We recall that at each fresh queries, we retain the matrix
Fovk ∈ Zm×` for later use. Upon receiving an adversarial query to open a signature
Σ =
(
ovk, c1, cˆ1, cˆ2, Π, sig
)
, the challenger recovers the corresponding small-norm
matrix Fovk which was defined when A first queried H1(ovk) (we can assume
w.l.o.g. that each opening query on ovk is preceded by hash query on the same
ovk). This matrix is used to “decrypt” (c1, c2) for the correspondingG = H1(ovk).
Thanks to Lemma 3, the distribution of (B?,G) is statistically close to that of
Game 2. Therefore, Game 2 and Game 3 are statistically indistinguishable and
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
Game 4. We modify the generation of the challenge signature Σ?. Instead of
faithfully generating the NIZKAoK Π?, the challenger simulates it without using
the witnesses via the HVZK simulator of the underlying argument system and by
programming the random oracle H as in the proof of Theorem 2 (in the unlikely
event that H has to be programmed on an input for which it is already defined,
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the challenger aborts the experiment and outputs 1). Thanks to the statistical
zero-knowledge property of the argument scheme, the simulated signature Π?
produced in this manner is statistically indistinguishable from a real signature.
Game 3 is then statistically indistinguishable from Game 4 as long as the challenger
does not fail in the simulation of Π?. However, such a failure event occurs with
negligible probability and we have |Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ∈ negl(λ).
Game 5. In this game, we change the generation of the ciphertext (c?1, c?2) during
the challenge phase in step 2 of the Sign algorithm. Namely, instead of using
the real encryption algorithm of GPV IBE, the challenger generates a random
ciphertext. In other words, the challenger sets
c?1 := z1, c?2 := z2 + bq/2c · bin(db),
for randomly chosen (z1, z2)← U(Zmq × Z`q). The hardness of the LWE problem
implies that Game 5 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 4. Indeed,
distinguishing between these two experiments would require A to distinguish
(B? | G?)T s0 + (eT1 | eT2 )T from (zT1 |zT2 )T , which contradicts the decisional LWE
assumption. Under the LWE assumption, we have |Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ∈ negl(λ).
Game 6. Finally we make a conceptual change on the previous game. Namely we
sample random (z˜1, z˜2) ∈ Zmq ×Z`q and set (c?1, c?2) in step 2 of the Sign algorithm
to be (z˜1, z˜2). Clearly, Game 6 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 5.
Since Game 6 does no longer depend on the bit b ∈ {0, 1} identifying the
target signer, the advantage of A in Game 6 is then zero, which concludes our
proof. uunionsq
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4: Anonymity against the Opening Authority
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3 described in the
previous section. We proceed with a sequence of Games that ends in a game
where the adversary’s advantage is unconditionally zero. The main idea is that
in the security game, the adversary has at disposal the secret key of the inside
layer of the proof system, meaning that we can view the ciphertext (c1, c2) in
step 2 of the signing algorithm as a plaintext. For each i, we call Si the event
that the adversary wins in Game i.
Game 0. This is the actual security game as described in Definition 6. By
hypothesis, the advantage of A in this game is ε = |Pr[S0]− 1/2|.
Game 1. In this game, we program the random oracle H2 in the following way.
At the beginning of the game, we choose an uniform matrix Gˆ? ← U(Zn×`dlog qeq ),
and in the challenge phase, we set H2(M?) = Gˆ?0. From the attacker’s view, the
distribution of Gˆ?0 is as in Game 0. As for other H2-queries, on a fresh query
on the input M , the challenger samples a small-norm matrix EM ←↩ D`dlog qeZn,σ ,
sets H2(M) = C · EM mod q and retains the chosen matrix EM for later use.
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We notice that the attacker is not allowed to query a token for M?. Then, we
remark that the value of H2(M) is statistically close to the uniform distribution
over Zndlog qeq as in [20]. This game is therefore indistinguishable from Game 0:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ∈ negl(λ).
Game 2. In this game, we change the way the challenger handles token queries.
First, we start by picking a random matrix C? ← U(Zn×mq ) at the outset of the
game, without generating a GPV trapdoor for it. Then, in order to answer token
queries on a message M , the challenger recalls the matrix EM , and hands it as
tM . Thanks to Lemma 3, the distribution of tM remains the same as in the real
game. Then, Game 1 remains statistically indistinguishable from Game 2.
Game 3. Here, in the challenge phase, we modify the generation of the chal-
lenge signature Σ?. Instead of using the witnesses to generate the NIZK proof
Π?, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2 using the ZK simulator of
the underlying argument system to generate the proof Π ′ of the signature
Σ? =
(
ovk?, c?1, cˆ?1, cˆ?2, Π ′, sig?
)
without using the witness. For the same reason
as in the proof of Theorem 3, we have that Game 3 is statistically indistinguishable
from Game 2.
Game 4. In this game, we change the way the challenge signature Σ? is generated.
Instead of faithfully computing the ciphertext (cˆ?1, cˆ?2) of bin(c?2), the challenger
samples uniformly random (zˆ1, zˆ2) ∈ Znq × Z`dlog qeq and sends
Σ? =
(
ovk?, c?1, zˆ?2, zˆ?2 + bq/2c · bin(c?2), Π ′, sig?
)
,
as a challenge signature. This game is computationally indistinguishable from
Game 3 from the assumed hardness of the decisional LWE problem. The LWE
assumption implies that |Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ∈ negl(λ).
Game 5. Finally, we make a conceptual change in the signature. Instead of sending
(zˆ?1, zˆ?2 + bq/2cbin(c?2)) in the challenge signature Σ?, the challenger samples
(z˜?1, z˜?2) ← U(Znq × Z`dlog qeq ) and uses them in place of (zˆ?1, zˆ?2 + bq/2c · bin(c?2))
to construct Σ?. Game 5 is indistinguishable from Game 4.
The last game is clearly independent of the challenger’s bit b ∈ {0, 1} that
determines the signer’s identity and it follows that AdvA(Game 5) = 0. uunionsq
B Proof of Lemma 5
We first restate Lemma 5.
Lemma 7. The protocol in Figure 1 is a sZKAoK for the relation Rabstract with
perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(L log q).
In particular:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input (P,v), outputs an accepted
transcript which is statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
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– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of
the challenge Ch, outputs x′ ∈ VALID such that P · x′ = v mod q.
Proof. It can be checked that the protocol has perfect completeness: If an honest
prover follows the protocol, then he always gets accepted by the verifier. It is
also easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O˜(L log q).
We now will prove that the protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge argument
of knowledge for the relation Rabstract.
Zero-Knowledge Property. We construct a PPT simulator SIM interacting
with a (possibly dishonest) verifier V̂ , such that, given only the public input, SIM
outputs with probability negligibly close to 2/3 a simulated transcript that is
statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
The simulator first chooses a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This is a prediction of
the challenge value that V̂ will not choose.
Case Ch = 1: Using basic linear algebra over Zq, SIM computes a vector
x′ ∈ ZLq such that P · x′ = v mod q. Next, it samples r ←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S),
and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends the commitment CMT =(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′1 = COM(pi,P · r; ρ1), C ′2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Tpi(x′ + r); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
pi,x′ + r, ρ1, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
pi, r, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 2: SIM samples x′ ←↩ U(VALID), r ←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S), and ran-
domness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′1 = COM(pi,P · r; ρ1), C ′2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Tpi(x′ + r); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
Tpi(x′), Tpi(r), ρ2, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
pi, r, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples x′ ←↩ U(VALID), r ←↩ U(ZLq ), pi ←↩ U(S), and ran-
domness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then it sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where C ′2 = COM(Tpi(r); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Tpi(x′ + r); ρ3) as in the previous
two cases, while
C ′1 = COM(pi,P · (x′ + r)− v; ρ1),
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, it responds as follows:
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– If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
– If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
We observe that, in every case we have considered above, since COM is statistically
hiding, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the
challenge Ch from V̂ are statistically close to those in the real interaction. Hence,
the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover,
one can check that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an
accepted transcript, the distribution of which is statistically close to that of the
prover in the real interaction. In other words, we have constructed a simulator
that can successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly
close to 2/3.
Argument of Knowledge. Suppose that RSP1 = (tx, tr, ρ2, ρ3), RSP2 =
(pi2,y, ρ1, ρ3), RSP3 = (pi3, r3, ρ1, ρ2) are 3 valid responses to the same commit-
ment CMT = (C1, C2, C3), with respect to all 3 possible values of the challenge.
The validity of these responses implies that:
tx ∈ VALID;
C1 = COM(pi2,P · y− v; ρ1) = COM(pi3,P · r3; ρ1);
C2 = COM(tr; ρ2) = COM(Tpi3(r3); ρ2);
C3 = COM(tx + tr; ρ3) = COM(Tpi2(y); ρ3).
Since COM is computationally binding, we can deduce that:
tx ∈ VALID;pi2 = pi3; tr = Tpi3(r3); tx + tr = Tpi2(y);P · y− v = P · r3 mod q.
Let x′ = y − r3, then we have Tpi2(x′) = tx ∈ VALID which implies that
x′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we have P · x′ = P · (y− r3) = v mod q.
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
C Building Blocks
C.1 The Ling-Nguyen-Wang Group Signature
We build our scheme on the [34] group signature scheme, which is described as
follows.
Let n be the security parameter, and N = Poly(n) be the maximum expected
number of group users. The other parameters are chosen such that Boyen’s
signature scheme [9] and the GPV IBE scheme [20] function properly and are
secure, like in Section 4.1.
We choose hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×`q , which goal is to produce `
random syndromes for the multi-bit version of GPV, and H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}t
which goal is to provide challenges for the Stern’s protocol in the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic, and select a one time signature scheme ΠOTS = (G,S,V). Let χ denote
the b-bounded LWE distribution over Z.
The group signature is described as follows:
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KeyGen(1n, 1N ): Given a dimension n and a number of group users N = 2`:
1. Generate verification key (A,A0, . . . ,A`,u) ∈ (Zn×mq )`+1 × Znq and
signing key TA ∈ Zm×m for Boyen’s signature scheme. Then for each
d = (d1, . . . , d`) ∈ {0, 1}`, use TA to generates gsk[d] as Boyen’s signa-
ture on message d.
2. Generate encryption and decryption master keys pair (B,TB) ∈ Zn×mq ×
Zm×m for the GPV-IBE scheme.
3. Output
gpk = ((A,A0, . . . ,A`,u),B); gmsk = TB; gsk = {gsk[id]}id∈{0,1}` .
Sign(gsk[d],M): Given gpk, to sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ using the secret key
gsk[d] = z, the user generates a key pair (ovk, osk)← OKeygen(1n) for ΠOTS,
and then perform the following steps:
1. Encrypt the index d with respect to “identity” ovk using the GPV IBE:
(c1 = BT s+ e1, c2 = GT s+ e2 + bq/2c · d ) ∈ Zmq × Z`q,
with e1, e2, s←↩ χn × χ` × χm, and G = H1(ovk).
2. Generate a NIZKPoK Π to show the possession of a valid message-
signature pair (id, z) for Boyen’s signature and that (c1, c2) is a correct
GPV IBE encryption of d with respect to identity ovk. The argument
system is described in [34]. The message is embedded in the challenge of
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to construct NIZK proofs.
3. Compute a one-time signature sig = OSign(ovk; c1, c2, Π).
4. Output the signature Σ = (ovk, (c1, c2), Π, sig).
Verify(gpk,M,Σ): Parse Σ as before. Check that OVer(ovk; sig, (c1, c2), Π) = 1,
otherwise return 0. Verify that Π is a valid proof, otherwise return 0. If all
verifications succeed, return 1.
Open(gmsk,M,Σ): Given gmsk = TB and a signatureΣ = (ovk, (c1, c2), Π, sig),
this algorithm decrypt (c1, c2) using GPV-IBE decryption algorithm with
respect to the identity ovk and returns the decrypted identity id.
C.2 The Boyen and Micciancio-Peikert Signatures
This section recalls a variant [35] of Boyen’s signature [9], which we use in our
scheme to generate the group user secret key. The scheme is parameterized by
`, denoting the size of the message that can be signed. The difference between
the original scheme and [35] is the use of a vector u ∈ Zmq : instead of computing
signatures as short vectors in a message-dependent lattice, Micciancio and Peikert
[35] use a shifted lattice.
Keygen(1λ, 1`): To generate the sk and pk from λ, `, this algorithm starts by
choosing n = Θ(λ), q = Poly(λ), α−1 = Poly(λ), σ = α · q and m ≥ Ω(n log q).
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1. Use GenTrap(1n, 1m, q) to generates a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq along with a
trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×m.
2. Sample uniformly `+ 1 matrices A0, . . . ,A` ∈R Zn×mq .
3. Sample uniformly a vector u ∈R Znq
4. Output
pk = {A,A0, . . . ,A`,u} sk = TA
Sign(pk, sk,M): To sign a message M = m1 . . .m` ∈ {0, 1}` with signing key sk.
1. Use ExtBasis and pk to compute a trapdoor basis TM for the matrix
M =
[
A | A0 +
∑`
i=1mi ·Ai
]
∈ Zn×2mq .
2. Use GPVSample to get a vector x ∈ DΛuq (M),σ.
3. Output x ∈ Z2m as the signature.
Verify(pk,M,x): To verify a signature x w.r.t a message M and a public key pk:
1. Verify that ‖x‖ ≤ σ√2m, if not, output 0 (corresponding to a rejection).
2. Compute the matrix M =
[
A | A0 +
∑`
i=1mi ·Ai
]
∈ Zn×2mq using pk.
3. Verify that M · x = u mod q. If not, output 0.
4. If everything went correctly, output 1.
C.3 The Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan IBE
This section recalls the dual Regev cryptosystem, which was proposed by Gentry
et al. [20] and readily implies an IBE system due to its “obliviously samplable”
public key space.
The multi-bit variant of the GPV IBE uses a hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×`q
modeled as a random oracle, where ` denotes the bit-length of the message. In
the following χ denotes the LWE distribution.
Setup(1λ): Using algorithm GenTrap(1n, 1m, q), generate a statistically uniform
matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with its trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×m consisting of a short basis
of Λ⊥q (A). Output the master public key mpk := A ∈ Zn×mq and the master
secret msk := TA ∈ Zm×m.
Extract(A,TA, id): If a private key for the identity id has already been released,
return the same skid. Otherwise, let G = H(id) and use SamplePre to return
a small-norm matrix E ∈ Zm×` such that A ·E = G mod q.
Encrypt(A, id,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}` w.r.t. identity id. Let
G = H(id). We sample s←↩ χn, e1 ←↩ χm, e2 ←↩ χ`, and output
c =
(
AT s+ e1,GT s+ e2 + bq/2c ·m
) ∈ Zmq × Z`q.
Dec(E, (c1, c2)): Output m′ =
(
1 | 2 | 4 | . . . | 2`−1) · b(c2 −ET · c1) · (q/2)e.
27
